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ABSTRACT
Banks around the world maintain excess regulatory capital, whether to minimize capitalization costs or to mitigate risks of financial di-
fficulties. However, it was only after the financial crisis of 2008 that the quality of capital gained greater importance among international 
regulators, through the Third Basel Accord (Basel III), which suggested a capital structure formed of the new equity and debt hybrid 
instruments, that is, Contingent Convertibles (CoCos), which have the main goal of recapitalizing banks automatically when they show 
signs of financial difficulties. Using the continuous-time structural model developed by Koziol and Lawrenz (2012), with December 2013 
as a reference, this paper analyzes the capital structure of the 10 biggest Brazilian banks in terms of total assets, comparing their current 
structures - with only subordinated debts - with the structure proposed in Basel III, composed solely of contingent convertibles, with a 
view to verifying the influence of CoCos in banks’ risks and evaluating the effectiveness of this Basel III recommendation. Through the 
evidence obtained using the model mentioned, this paper’s main contribution is in demonstrating that the use of CoCos would optimize 
the capital structure of banks under the restrictions of Basel III, considering these are effective. If not, the automatic recapitalization of 
these instruments could be used for shareholders’ own benefit, thus increasing the likelihood of banks experiencing financial difficulties, 
which could cause a new financial crisis, like that which occurred in 2008.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
bank. Or still, in some cases such as that of Banco do Bra-
sil, the debt is converted into equity for the bank, and the 
principal lost for the investor; the big advantage of CoCos 
is automatic “recapitalization” at a low cost. 
Since the crisis of 2007 and new regulations, many stu-
dies have been developed regarding the capital structure of 
banks. Albul, Jaffee, and Tchistyi (2010) elaborated a finan-
cial model that allows the capital structure of banks with 
CoCos and subordinated debt to be analyzed, applying di-
fferent types of restrictions. These authors concluded that 
CoCos, with the correct risk incentive restrictions and in 
contrast to subordinated debts, protect the shareholder 
equity of banks against financial crises, as well as offering 
greater tax benefits. Barucci and Del Viva (2012) showed 
that CoCos are useful instruments for dealing with the ne-
gative effects of the phenomenon of risk displacement from 
banks to investors, at the heart of the 2007 crisis. They the-
oretically analyzed the capital structure of banks which is-
sue subordinated debt and CoCos with conversion depen-
dent on macroeconomic (counter-cyclical) conditions, and 
in doing so concluded that CoCos are more efficient that 
subordinated debts with regards to risk incentive restric-
tions, since, despite leaving banks slightly more leveraged, 
a large part of risk is absorbed by the holders of CoCos and 
not by banks themselves. Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) deve-
loped a time-continuous structural model, which determi-
nes – over time – the optimum capital structure for a bank 
with subordinated debts and CoCos. These authors showed 
that CoCos have a beneficial impact on the structure of 
banks, maximizing their value, as long as risk incentive and 
displacement restrictions are well defined. If not, they can 
substantially increase the likelihood of financial difficulties. 
Guidara, Soumaré, and Tchana (2013) analyzed the rela-
tionship between excess regulatory capital and the econo-
mic cycles of the six biggest Canadian banks between 1982 
and 2010, using a simultaneous equations model based on 
risk and equity variables calculated by the banks; they con-
cluded that they are well capitalized, given that they exceed 
the minimum regulatory requirements by 5.09% and the 
leverage ratio by 0.49%, with these being some of the re-
asons why they resisted the crisis of 2007 well. Moreover, 
Canadian banks have conservative mortgage practices, are 
not totally financed by the monetary market, and maintain 
high levels of liquidity.   
Thus, the aim of this paper is to verify the influence of 
using CoCos on banks’ risks, evaluating the effectiveness of 
this Basel III recommendation. Capitalization with CoCos 
versus the use of subordinated debts was also evaluated. 
The main study hypothesis is that the use of CoCos would 
optimize the capital structure of banks under the restric-
tion of Basel III.  
The Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) model was applied to the 
structure of the 10 biggest Brazilian banks in terms of total 
assets (75.1% of the Brazilian National Financial System, or 
SFN, using the initials in Portuguese) using records from 
In 2007, the equity of the 20 biggest banks in the United 
States – that is, almost two thirds of US banking assets – 
was 11.7% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs), with 8% being 
the minimum suggested by Basel II. Nevertheless, many 
failed or required government assistance, primarily as a re-
sult of them being essentially capitalized in subordinated 
debts, to which it is provided capital to protect depositors, 
however also allows an increase in banks’ leverage, cance-
ling part or all of the effect of reducing the likelihood of fi-
nancial difficulties (Pennacchi, 2010) and showing that the 
regulation of capital in place at the time was extremely fra-
gile (Kuritzkes & Scott, 2009; Calomiris & Herring, 2011).
The increase in leverage exacerbates moral risk and this 
is difficult to identify within the financial system, given that 
financial difficulties can, in fact, be caused by external and 
unpredictable factors, and not necessarily by reckless beha-
vior on the part of banks (Dam & Koetter, 2012). Because 
of this, governments tend to assist banks with financial di-
fficulties, especially those with systemic importance in the 
local or global economy, in order to avoid new crises. In 
turn, banks, aware of this implicit “guarantee”, tend to as-
sume more risk in order to increase their returns; this is 
the so called “too big to fail” effect. Similarly, investors, in 
perceiving this “too big to fail” effect, migrate their resour-
ces to big banks, believing that they are safer, given the im-
plicit government protection (Oliveira, Schiozer, & Barros, 
2015). This practice makes the position of governments 
facing bank bankruptcies even more difficult, since the op-
tion of not saving one big bank could shatter confidence 
in the entire banking system, with grave consequences for 
economic activity.
With a view to alleviating these problems, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), through 
Basel III, proposed new recommendations for the capital 
structure of banks, in order to make it more effective in 
absorbing losses and initially transferring the entire onus 
of the recovery of banks to investors and owners, in an 
attempt to avoid this responsibility falling on the gover-
nment and, consequently, on society.  Basel III brings to 
capital structure a new equity and debt hybrid instrument, 
the CoCo, originally proposed by Flannery (2005); it is 
composed of debt instruments, which are compulsorily 
perpetual and convertible into shares in banks when they 
suffer financial difficulties. Before conversion, the CoCo 
behaves as a common subordinated debt, paying a perio-
dic coupon. In its contract, a debt conversion trigger is de-
fined, which could be an accounting measurement (Basel 
III, 2010; Glasserman & Nouri, 2010), or one involving the 
market value of banks’ shares (Flannery, 2005; Calomi-
ris & Herring, 2011), among other methodologies. Thus, 
once a bank exhibits financial difficulties and touches the 
minimum threshold defined in the contract, the trigger is 
activated and part or the entire principal invested is auto-
matically transformed into equity for the bank, with the 
investor, in turn, receiving the principal in shares in the 
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2009 to 2013. This allowed the optimal capital structure for 
these banks to be estimated for December 2013 (4Q2013) 
and each bank in the sample to be evaluated comparative-
ly, with only subordinated debts and when these are totally 
substituted by CoCos. Furthermore, the model also allows 
the behavior of banks in relation to CoCos to be evaluated, 
when there are no restrictive regulations for the taking or 
displacement of risk. The evidence obtained suggests that, 
according to the model, the banks in the sample would be 
better capitalized if their capital structures were composed 
solely of CoCos, when there is regulation restricting the 
taking and displacement of risk. However, in the absence of 
these regulations, the banks would exhibit greater risk with 
CoCos than with subordinated debts.
This paper, as far as is known, is the first to evaluate the 
use of CoCos in comparison with subordinated debts in ca-
pitalizing Brazilian banks. This paper contributes not only 
to the decisions taken by managers when composing their 
capital structures, but also in examining the effectiveness of 
regulators recommending Basel III.
 2 BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW
The idea that regulatory bodies distort banks’ incenti-
ves, limiting their leverage through equity, may have been 
true until the 80s; after this time, banks came to raise and 
maintain excess capital, due to an own incentive of protec-
ting themselves against risks. Peura and Keppo (2005) call 
this excess capital “hedging” against breaches of minimum 
capital, and estimate some average percentage values for 
excess capital of between 2.4% and 3.5% above the regula-
tory minimum. Studies by Teixeira, Silva, Fernandes, and 
Alves (2014), and VanHoose (2007), showed that banks 
maintain excess capital in order to avoid emergency reca-
pitalization costs.  
Flannery and Rangan (2008), in a study regarding big 
banks in the United States in the 90s, provided evidence 
of post-recession capital growth, with banks accumulating, 
on average, 75% of capital above the regulatory minimum, 
in a rational reply on the part of the banking market to the 
measure of withdrawing implicit government guarantees. 
In Basel I, the minimum regulatory capital recommended 
was 4% of level I and 8% in total, but the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) itself 
specified that banks with level I above 5% and with level II 
above 10% were considered “well capitalized”; that is, there 
was not only an indirect government incentive to main-
tain excess capital but also the concept that this guaranteed 
good capitalization of banks.  
Brazil adhered to the Basel regulations in 1994 and, 
in 1997, with the stabilization of the Real Plan and of the 
Brazilian economy, the Brazilian Central Bank, or BACEN, 
using the initials in Portuguese, opted for a more conser-
vative position in relation to the Basel ratio, raising the mi-
nimum capital required from 8% to 11% of RWA, in order 
to have an “excess of regulated capital”. Even still, Brazilian 
banks maintained excess capital of, on average, 4.5 percen-
tage points above the minimum required, as can be obser-
ved in Figure 1.
 Figure 1   Average Basel Ratio of banks in the SFN. 
Source: BACEN Financial Stability Report. Developed by the authors.
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With the new Basel III Accord requirements, the per-
centage of capital comes to be 11%, and so Brazil would 
already comply; however, it is the changes in the structu-
re of this capital that is, in fact, of interest to the scope of 
this paper. Regarding capital structure, level I comes to be 
composed of portions of core capital (share capital, retai-
ned earnings, and reserves), additional capital (CoCos), 
and an amount that is complementary to the minimum re-
gulatory requirements (also composed of share capital and 
CoCos, accumulated during favorable periods in economic 
cycles and used in moments of stress, or rather, during the 
operations of institutions). Level II capital is composed 
of elements that are able to absorb losses in the case of it 
becoming unfeasible for institutions to operate, that is, su-
bordinated debts. The debt instruments have a maximum 
limit of participation in each portion of capital: CoCos in 
additional level I capital – up to 15 % of total level I, and su-
bordinated debts – up to 50% of total level I. Moreover, the 
minimum threshold defined for the conversion of CoCos 
is 4.5% of RWA. 
With a view to evaluating how much the issuance of 
CoCos affects banks’ values, Pennacchi (2010) compares 
risk incentives between banks that issue CoCos and those 
that only issue subordinated debts and shows that the be-
nefit of CoCos may be offset if a bank has the incentive to 
increase its risk in search of higher returns, given that the 
conversion of the principal into capital transfers the origi-
nal shareholders’ risk to investors in these securities, and 
the incentives for displacement to riskier assets increases as 
the equity of the bank decreases. However, when the con-
version limit is relatively elevated in relation to own equity, 
that is, when the original shareholders run the risk of losing 
their current positions to new shareholders, given the con-
version of CoCos, these come to restrict of the incentives 
for risk. Calomiris and Herring (2011) propose a conver-
sion amount for CoCos relative to net equity, and not res-
tricted to the 15% of the total of level I, in order to mitigate 
delays in the recognition of losses through combinations 
of accounting values, since all loss that is “window dres-
sed” and transformed into net equity would be covered by a 
contingent convertible and, the greater this loss, the greater 
the value of conversion and the lower the participation of 
original shareholders in the company total. Sundersan and 
Wang (2014) propose that the conversion of CoCos should 
be based on the market equilibrium. Thus, CoCos should 
be publicly tradable, with mandatory conversion based on 
observable market value, or rather, on informative criteria, 
that is difficult to manipulate and independent from regu-
lator intervention, making the market price an indicator of 
banks’ financial difficulties. Since the CoCo is converted 
and its owners become part of bank equity, the equilibrium 
is in the preference for conversion on the part of the ow-
ners of CoCos as opposed to preference for non conversion 
on the part of the shareholders. This way, the big question 
regarding the efficiency of the new rules proposed by Basel 
III is in the CoCo conversion trigger, and not in the fact 
that they are more efficient instruments than subordinated 
debts for mitigating problems of moral risk and “too big to 
fail”.
In Brazil, the new Basel III rules will be implemented 
gradually over the course of six years (2014 to 2019), and, 
in this context, Sobreira and Silva (2012) analyzed the po-
tential impacts of these rules on Brazilian banks. From a 
sample of 92 Brazilian public and private banks, the authors 
apply the Central Bank of Brazil’s rules and observe that the 
main private banks have a comfortable position in relation 
to the minimum Basel III requirements; public banks, in 
turn, will have to increase their equity through an increase 
in share capital or through issuing debt securities.  
Also with a view to the capitalization of Brazilian banks, 
this paper stands apart from others, since its focus is on 
the capitalization efficiency of the instruments that compo-
se the capital structure of banks, when there are restrictive 
regulations for risk incentive or displacement, as well as the 
systemic risk of each of these instruments when these regu-
lations are not in place.
 3   METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
Among the different models regarding company ca-
pital structure (Bhattacharya, Plank, Strobl, & Zechner, 
2002; Decamps, Rochet, & Roger, 2004; among others), 
the Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) model was chosen, prima-
rily for being a model developed for commercial banks, a 
characteristic that avoids potential adaptations necessary 
for models intended for companies in general. The second 
reason is that the model is current and post Basel III, and 
takes into account the characteristics defined by regulation 
for CoCos. Finally, the variables that are necessary for the 
model are public or can be estimated with public data for 
banks; Banco do Brasil (BB) will be used to present the 
model.
As a hypothesis, proposals 1, 2, and 3 of the model will 
be empirically verified.
3.1   Optimal capital under BACEN and Basel III 
Regulations
The model projects bank cash flow based on the histo-
ric record, using the stochastic differential equation 1.
          1
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π = d +b + c
in which constants μ and σ represent, respectively, return 
and total volatility of cash flows. xt are projected cash flows, 
represented by Earnings Before Interest and Income Tax 
(EBIT); in period t and zt   it is a standard Wiener process 
which, through the Geometric Brownian motion, genera-
tes random cash flows. For each cash flow generated, the 
model estimates an optimal capital structure, however, our 
interest here lies solely in one estimate, that for 4Q2013, 
that is, t is equal to 1.   
Summing the interest paid by subordinated debts, equi-
ty and debt hybrid instruments, deposits, and taxation ex-
penses (PIS, COFINS and ISS), the EBIT for BB will be:
Table 1  BB Income statement
INCOME STATEMENT 
(R$ bn)










Interest paid on 
deposits
EBIT (Xt)
4Q13 4,160 1,244 2,387 1,451 16,236 25,478
Source: Spreadsheet of historical series for 4Q2013 – Available from: <http://www.bb.com.br/portalbb/page206,136,145,0,0,1,8.bb>. Developed by the authors.
A 5-year (2009 to 2013) quarterly record of EBIT is 
used, in which μ is calculated by the average of returns 
of EBITs and σ is the standard deviation in the series 
of calculatedμ' s. For BB we have: μ= 0.01 and σ=0.11. 
The threshold (ξ) is the minimum value of cash flow 
that the bank can reach, from which it begins suffe-
ring financial difficulties. The Equation 2 defines this 
threshold relates the level of bank debt (π) and a cons-
tant ϕ which represents the regulatory restriction for 
minimum capital.
          2
          3
          4
ξ(π)= ϕπ
The level of debt π is the sum of the coupons and in-
terest paid by the bank, which may be subordinated debt 
coupons (b), CoCo coupons (c) or interest on deposits 
(d), so we have Equation 3.
To estimate constant ϕ, the Bank and Lawrenz (2010) ap-
proach will be used, which relates  required reference equi-
ty (RRE) – regulatory minimum of 11% of RWA – with the 
bank’s current reference equity (RE), as shown in Equation 4.
For ϕ > 0, if  ϕ=1, the bank exhibits evidence of fi-
nancial difficulties, since its RE has reached the mini-
mum regulatory limit defined by BACEN; if ϕ > 1, the 
bank has strict financial restrictions, even if its current 
cash flow exceeds the payment of interest; and if ϕ < 1, 
it is assumed that the bank is able to raise new capital to 
avoid insolvency, even if its current cash flows are lower 
than the total payment of interest. In order to estimate 
the parameters presented, data from BB’s balance sheet 
will be used:
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The constant ϕ for 4Q2013 for BB is 76% and the level 
of debt π = R$ 20,074bn, therefore, the threshold is ξ(π)=R$ 
15,195bn. The model takes exogenous deposits into account, 
and thus, the choice variables for capital structure optimization 
will be interest on subordinated debts (b) and interest on Co-
Cos (c). Net equity is estimated by (St), as shown in Equation 5.
Table 2  Data from BB’s balance sheet
Date Xt d b c π A L NE C B D RWA BR LIRE LIIRE RE RRE
4Q13 25,478 16,236 2,387 1,451 20,074 1,303,915 1,231,690 72,225 39,404 32,519 491,013 813,623 14.53 85,501 32,733 118,234 89,499
Note. Xt – Cash flow; d – total interest paid on deposits; b – total interest paid on subordinated debts; c – total interest paid on CoCos; π – total interest paid by the 
bank; A – total assets; L – total liabilities; NE – net equity; C – amount of CoCos; B – amount of subordinated debts; D – amount of deposits; RWA – total risk weighted 
assets; BR – Basel ratio; LIRE – Level I RE; LIIRE – Level II RE. 
Source: Spreadsheet of historic series from 4Q2013 – Available from: <http://www.bb.com.br/portalbb/page206,136,145,0,0,1,8.bb>. Developed by the authors.
          5
          6
          7
          9
          10
          11
          8
in which τ is the corporate income tax, which has a value 
of τ = 0.40 and is defined by BACEN; r is the interest 
free rate, for which the SELIC rate from the last working 
day of 2013 was used, r = 10.4%. The amount       is 
the discount factor weighted by its probability, given by 
Equation 6.
For ease, the Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) notation will be adopted as shown in equations 7 and 8.
Thus, the net equity equation is:
For BB, the values are: β= -4.6869, V(xt,π)= 43,600, 
V(ξ,π)= -14,998, D(xt,ξ)= 0.1162 and St= R$ 45,342bn. 
The model assumes that deposits (d) are insured and that 
banks must pay an insurance premium given by:
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in which λ is the value of the percentage of bank liquida-
tion, at the moment this reaches the regulatory minimum, 
α is the cost of bankruptcy which, according to an estimate 
by Andrade and Kaplan (1998), presented in a study regar-
ding highly leveraged companies that suffered financial di-
fficulties between 1980 and 1989, is between 10% and 20% 
of a company’s value. These values are estimated by the di-
fference between the value of total equity before bankrup-
tcy and total equity paid in during bankruptcy. For the mo-
del, the average of these values, α = 15%, will be used. Thus, 
λ = 0.5100 and It  = R$8,185bn. Since deposits are insured, 
they become free of risk; this way, by discounting future 
payments by the risk free rate, the aggregate deposit value 
will be:
          12
          13
          14
          15
          16
          17
And for BB: Dt= 156,112bn. 
The current BACEN regulation allows banks to have both 
debts in their capital structure – that is, subordinated debts and 
CoCos; however, the model used only allows the bank’s endo-
genous debt to be one of the two types. Thus, the bank’s opti-
mal debt in subordinated debts is estimated and the same value 
in CoCos is considered, making it feasible to compare the two 
structures. As well as subordinated debts, BB has part of its capi-
tal structure in CoCos, however, for this study, these values will 
be added together and the bank’s total debt will be considered.
Initially, the total in subordinated debts will be assumed. 
Thus, b is the choice variable and the optimal coupon b* is the 
result of maximizing the value of all credits, liquid of deposit 
insurance:
The bank’s value is given by:
in which Bt is the amount in subordinated debts and D 
is the amount in deposit and with the general restric-
tion ξb=ϕ(d+b), the first derivative of Vtb with relati on 
to b is:
in which
Resolving the first order condition, we have the optimal debt:
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As for BB, Bt=B+C was considered, in which C is the 
amount in CoCos, we have Vtb= R$ 225,788bn, ζ= 2.3561, 
= 1.2130, b*= R$ 5,524bn. To calculate the new amount 
of subordinated debts (Bt), there is Equation 18.
Corresponding to the optimal debt coupons b*, θ will be 
defined, which is the fraction of the bank’s liquidation value 
that goes to shareholders. For θ, the Bulow and Shoven (1978) 
example regarding a company going into bankruptcy is used, 
and the value is calculated by dividing the sum of cash with 
the present value of future income by the debt securities. Thus, 
θ is equal to 4/5 of total bank assets, that is, 0.8%. For BB, Bt= 
R$ 45,244bn and the total debt optimal π = R$ 21,760bn, the 
new threshold ξb= R$ 16,471bn, net equity Stb= R$ 36,630bn, 
the value of the bank Vtb= R$ 229,801bn and the first derivati-
ve of Vtb with relation to b*       = -3.86.  
Once the optimal capital structure with subordinated 
debts is estimated, it is assumed that the entire subordinated 
debt coupon (b*) is transformed into CoCos, that is, b* = c, in 
which c is the coupon of debts in CoCos. The total amount of 
CoCos is given by Equation 19.
          18
          19
          21
          22
          23
          24
          20
in which γ is the rate of conversion of CoCos. To estimate 
it, the Pennacchi (2010) and Calormis and Herring (2011) 
approach is used, which defines it as being the ratio between 
the amount of optimal debt and of total assets in Equation 20.
The X parameter is the conversion threshold for the CoCos, given by Equation 21.
As b* = c, then X= optimal π= R$ 21,760bn. And ξc is the post-conversion threshold, given by Equation 22.
For BB, γ= 0.035, ξc = 12,289bn and Ct= 47,260bn. The net equity and the value of the bank with CoCos are, respecti-
vely:
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In fact,      = -3.86 <       = 5.12, and these results provide 
evidence of two conclusions: given coupon k, in which 
> 0 for the bank with CoCo, and     = 0 for its coun-
terpart with subordinated debts, it is concluded that c* 
must be greater than b*. Having optimal debt, the value 
of the bank in CoCos is greater than the value of the 
bank with subordinated debts, that is, Vb (b*)<Vc (c*). 
This is because higher coupons allow greater tax bene-
in which Z =log        , μ = μ -     and N(.) is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. The model expects 
that Pξc,T<Pξb,T and, in fact, for BB, the inequality is verified: 
Pξc,T= 0.00000010357864% < Pξb,T= 0.048315833%.
Proposal 1 says that a security developed in optimal 
conditions increases a bank’s value and attenuates the gra-
For BB, Stc= 36,134bn and Vtc= 231,311bn. Compa-
ring current net equity with the model estimates (St= R$ 
45,342bn, Stb = R$36,630bn, Stc = R$36,134bn), it is obser-
ved that the proposed increase in the amount of subordi-
nated debts allows a reduction in net equity, given that the 
greater financing brings greater tax benefits. In the case of 
CoCos, the reduction in net equity is a little greater, since 
all or part of this debt is considered as equity by the benefit 
of the conversion, as well as having a greater tax benefit, 
given that in general CoCos pay a higher coupon. Howe-
ver, this approach of comparing net equities ignores the 
fact that the issuance of CoCos alters the bank’s total debt 
capacity; thus, in the same way as happens with subordina-
ted debts, the interest resides in maximizing the company’s 
value through the optimal coupon of CoCos (c*). Koziol 
and Lawrenz (2012) show that coupon c* exists, but it is 
not possible to determine it analytically; thus, the company 
value maximization equation is given by:
in which
          25
          26
          27
          28
For BB,        = 5.12 with ζc= - 14.017.  With these results, 
we proceed to analyze whether CoCos are a good alternative 
for banks, comparing the maximization of bank value with 
each one of these debts:
fits, without increasing insolvency risk, given the benefit 
of conversion. At BB: Vb (b*)= R$229,802bn < Vc (c*)= 
R$231,312bn.
The bank gets into financial difficulties when cash 
flow xt touches the threshold ξb, in the case of financing 
with subordinated debts, and ξc, in the case of CoCos. 
The likelihood of the bank getting into financial difficul-
ties is given by Equation 28.
vity of financial crises, given the low likelihood of financial 
difficulties and the lower present value of costs of financial 
difficulties.
With the results obtained, evidence is provided that Pro-
posal 1 is valid for BB, and so it cannot be rejected, given 
that: ϕ =0.76 < 1 and        = -3.86 <       = 5.12.
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is low, shareholders have incentives to increase risk, that is, 
>0. If the restriction is rigid, that is, ξ is sufficiently high, 
then the holders of debts have incentives to avoid risks, 
<0. For BB, we have      = 60,525 > 0, that is, according 
to the model, BB has a low ξ threshold and, therefore, sha-
reholders have incentives to increase risks. In fact, having 
incentives to increase risks does not mean that the bank will 
increase them, but rather, this may show that, despite the 
bank having the opportunity to increase its risk, it prefers to 
avoid it. The threshold at which risk preferences change is 
exactly at the point      =0, and the critical threshold is given 
by Equation 32.
with                                                   , and which can be interpreted 
as the present value of perpetual income flow, free of risks 
and taxes, given a level of profit. For a given level of debt, 
V(ξ,π) is negative when the conversion threshold ξ is suffi-
ciently small, and positive for a higher threshold. That is, 
with more rigid financial restrictions (higher ξ threshold), 
and in the case of insolvency, holders of debt give up a hi-
gher value of cash flow in relation to debits, making them 
apprehensive in relation to the risk of financial stress. In 
the case of a bank with financing in subordinated debts, the 
risk preferences depend on the exogenous restriction ξ. If 
the restriction is sufficiently weak, so that the ξ threshold 
3.2   Determination of Optimal Capital with Risk 
Taking Incentive
From now on it is assumed that there are no restric-
tive regulations for risk incentives or displacement and, 
therefore, banks have the option of relaxing their moni-
toring of risks, thus avoiding monitoring costs and incre-
asing expected income. The increase in risk comes from 
the displacement of investments towards assets that are 
riskier and have a higher expected return, thus, the model 
assumes that the volatility of current cash flow is σl and 
banks have the irreversible option of increasing their risk 
to σh, while the return on these flows (μ) remains unalte-
red in relation to price. To measure the new likelihood of 
insolvency embedded in the return on these flows (μ), the 
(real) physical rate of deviation μP will be needed. Accor-
ding to Decamps et al. (2004), and Koziol and Lawrenz 
(2012), the increase in risk σ is offset by a corresponding 
increase in the rate of physical deviation (μP), for a given 
market risk price (ψ>0), so that the return over cash flow 
(μ) remains constant, that is:
          29
          30
          31
          32
for  ψ>0, consistent with the deduction of Bollen (1997), it is considered that:
and for BB ψ= 0.036884. 
The risk preferences are evaluated by the sign of the first 
derivative of net equity in relation to the risk parameter (σ). 
For banks with subordinated debts, we have Equation 31.
,
in which:  if ξ > ξ, the bank does not have a preference for high 
risk, and if ξ < ξ, the bank has incentives for increasing risks, 
and if ξ = ξ, the bank is indifferent to the risk level strategy.
The threshold ξ suggests two intuitive characteristics, na-
mely: first, it depends directly on the bank’s potential for gro-
wth, that is, for a high μ, the ξ will be low and the bank will 
be able to raise capital in levels of cash flow for which a bank 
with lower growth would already find itself in financial diffi-
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CoCos at the optimal level. That is, for ξ=ϕπ, the optimal le-
vel of debt follows the rule: if ξ < ξ, then 0<     |b=b*<     |c=c*, in 
which banks prefer to take more risk to maintaining capital 
at the optimal level, in both debts; and if ξ > ξ, then       |b=b*<0 
and     |c=c*    0, in which banks prefer low risk with subordi-
nated debts, even though they can opt for higher risk with 
CoCos at the optimal level.
For BB:     = 60,525 <     = 139,003, ξ= 16,472 < critical ξ 
= 18,922 and     = 60,525 <       = 139,003. From the model, 
BB will never prefer high risk with financing in subordinated 
debts, but prefers low risk with financing in CoCos. 
The proposals of Koziol and Lawrence (2012) show that 
CoCos, in an environment with regulatory restrictions that 
allow arbitrage, increase the incentive for risk, which may 
lead to financial crises. This is because shareholders holding 
CoCos, in the case of financial difficulties, convert the debts 
maintaining their equity value, independently of whether 
such difficulties were caused by external motives like an 
economic crisis or by managers’ recklessness in the sense of 
taking on more risk to obtain higher returns.  This does not 
occur in the case of subordinated debts, in which financial 
difficulty leads to insolvency and, in this case, shareholders 
are the last to receive their obligations, if they do receive 
them. Thus, in non regulated environments or those with 
weak restrictions, subordinated debts work as an internal re-
gulation, or a disciplinary device. If subordinated debts are 
substituted by CoCos this device is mitigated and the incen-
tives for risk can be distorted. Analyzing the impacts of dis-
placement of risk on the banks’ net value, in an environment 
with complete information, investors can rationally antici-
pate shareholders’ risk choices and charge the corresponding 
price for this, that is, the debts will be priced according to the 
expected value of their risk σ. Thus, subordinated debts 
Given that        < 1, the optimal endogenous threshold 
will always be lower than the critical threshold ξ (ξ*<ξ), 
which shows that, free from financial restrictions, banks 
will always have the incentive to increase risks. For BB: 
critical ξ= R$18,922bn, ξ= R$16,472bn, optimal ξ*= R$ 
15,601bn. With its threshold ξ under the critical threshold 
(ξ< ξ), BB would have incentives to increase risks, consis-
tent with the results for the sign for the net equity deriva-
culties; and second, the threshold depends on the payment 
of interest (π), that is, if the level of debt is high, it is likely 
for the bank to suffer financial difficulties more quickly. If the 
bank does not suffer any exogenous restriction, the endoge-
nous threshold, called the optimal threshold, could be given 
by Equation 33.
tive in relation to risk       >0. It can also be noted that the 
critical threshold is above the optimal threshold (ξ* < ξ), 
as expected.
Assuming now that ξ(π)= ξ(π), we will analyze how 
risk preferences change when a bank, at the optimal debt 
level, exchanges subordinated debts for CoCos. Again, the 
sign for the net equity derivative with relation to risk in 
Equation 34.
          33
          34
in which X=ξ(d+c) is the conversion threshold for CoCos, 
at the moment in which the external restriction is manda-
tory. After conversion, if profits continue falling, the new 
threshold for financial difficulties will be ξc=ξ(d). By the defi-
nition of X and ξc, the terms V(X,d+c) and V(ξc,d) in Equa-
tion 19 are equal to zero. Again, the sign of the derivative is 
defined by                                                             >0, and V(X,d) 
will always be positive for γ<1. Thus, while current sharehol-
ders maintain a positive fraction of cash flow rights (γ<1), 
that is, they continue benefiting from conversion,        will 
always be positive, and they will always have the incentive to 
increase risk.
Proposal 2: it is a bank with subordinated debts that be-
gins experiencing financial difficulties (X=ξ(d+c) and ξc= ξ 
(d)), which leads management to be indifferent to an increa-
se in risk (       =0). If the bank exchanges subordinated debts 
for CoCos, in an optimal way, in which current shareholders 
maintain a positive fraction of cash flow (γ<1), managers 
will always have the incentive to increase risk,        >0.
The numbers for BB are: X= R$18,922bn, γ= 0.3135,        = 
139.003, confirming Proposal 2. 
The incentive to increase risk by return is also present 
when risk restrictions exist, but are weak and allow arbitra-
tion, like for example, in the case of a regulation that does 
not define the CoCo conversion threshold. Thus, when a 
bank exchanges its subordinated debts for CoCos, maintai-
ning the coupon (b=c), the CoCos increase managers’ incen-
tive for risk so that       <       .
Proposal 3: with weak financial restrictions, banks will 
prefer to take more risk to maintaining capital at an optimal 
level, in both debts. In the case of strong financial restric-
tions, banks will always prefer low risk with subordinated 
debts, even if they can opt for higher risk with financing in 
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would be priced assuming a lower risk (σl), while CoCos 
would be priced assuming a higher risk (σh). Consequently, 
the value of banks with CoCos tends to be lower than the 
value of banks that have only subordinated debts; this is 
because, in general, in trade-off models, the tax benefits of 
debts are worth it while the bank is solvent, but incur heavy 
losses in the case of insolvency. A higher risk increases the 
likelihood of insolvency, which increases the present value 
of losses, without any additional advantage. Thus, the value 
of bank Vtb negatively depends on its risk σ, that is,
          36
          37
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for subordinated debts and
for CoCos. It was previously defined that Vb(b*)<Vc (c*), 
that is, the value of banks with CoCos is greater than the 
value with subordinated debts. In fact, this relationship will 
only be inverted in the case of a very large change in the 
risk preferences of a bank, that is, with an very large in-
crease in volatility (σh), reaching the critical level defined 
by σ =sup{σh | Vtc (σh) ≥ Vtb (σl)}, if not, the relationship is 
maintained. To analyze Brazilian banks, it is defined that 
the high risk (σh) be considered the critical level (σ), that is, 
σh=σ. For BB: Vtc (σh) ≥ Vtb (σl), that is,     = -6,510 and     = 
-5,000 < 0 and σl= 0.11196323 or 11%, σh=σ= 0.1228368 or 
12.28%. According to the model, the value of BB negatively 
depends on the risk (σ), that is, an increase in the risk σ 
leads to a fall in the value of the bank V(σ). Two points are 
worth highlighting: despite the greater risk associated, even 
still we expect to observe a higher value for the bank with 
CoCos than with subordinated debts, because the relaxing 
of financial restrictions leads the bank to take on more lo-
ans and, consequently, to have higher tax benefits, that is, 
to pay fewer taxes. Moreover, the spread required by in-
vestors for CoCos is higher than for subordinated debts, 
since they are constructed to be converted at the moment 
in which banks’ shares have the lowest value, that is, the 
high spread works as an insurance premium. Thus, banks 
with CoCos issued with a lower risk than the critical value 
(σh<σ) have a higher global value and imply greater wealth 
for shareholders.
Evaluating CoCos from a systemic point of view, the 
likelihood of insolvency will be considered, observing the 
differences in the risk parameters (σh,σl), extending the no-
tation of the probability of insolvency to Pξ,σ,T and calcula-
ting their difference in a time horizon T:
From Proposal 1, for  σh=σl, ΔPT is negative and gro-
ws uniformly with σh, that is, another critical value for σ 
exists in which the difference ΔPT becomes positive,(σ) 
=inf{σh|Pξ,σh,T ≥ Pξ,σl,T}. This reinforces the initial proposal 
that CoCos have benefits in situations of financial difficul-
ties, while banks do not have the ability to choose the risk 
that they will assume, that is, until σh=σl.  However, in non 
regulated environments or those with weak regulation, the 
likelihood of financial difficulties increases by the same 
proportion as the risk taken, and ends up offsetting the 
initial beneficial effects, with the critical limit for growth 
of risk the σ, above which banks, in fact, begin suffering 
financial difficulties, that is, there are levels of risk σh for 
which CoCos are an optimal ex ante strategy, increasing 
the values of banks, but with a greater likelihood of default 
in relation to subordinated debts. For BB: σl= 0.11196323, 
σh= 0.12068323, σ = 0.12283679. This means that risk σl= 
0.11196323 may increase to σh= 0.12068323 even without 
financial difficulties, but with a greater likelihood of insol-
vency. However, the limit for risk taking is σ = 0.12283679, 
in which the bank would begin to have financial difficul-
ties, that is, according to the model and without restriction 
on increasing risks, BB would have the incentive to take 
more risks with CoCos; and there is a limit of risk σ from 
which the bank would begin suffering financial difficulties. 
With these results, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected, given 
that    = 60,525 <     = 139,003. According to this model 
and with the adopted assumptions, the 10 biggest Brazilian 
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banks in terms of total assets will be analyzed. 
3.3   Sample Analysis
The sample is composed of the 10 biggest commercial 
banks in terms of total assets belonging to the SFN, with the 
analysis covering 1Q2009 to 4Q2013 (5 years). The SFN is 
very diverse and with a large concentration of assets and net 
equity (NE) in these 10 banks, and so the SFN was divided 
into three NE bands, in order to group banks of the same size:
a) Below 1%: NE of up to 1% of the SFN (86 banks – 15% 
of the SFN);
b) Between 1% and 3%: NE from 1% to 3% of the SFN (5 
banks – 11% of the SFN);
c) Above 3%: NE of 3% or more of the SFN (5 banks – 
74% of the SFN).
The study sample is concentrated in groups b and c, and 
the model’s main variables are: threshold (ξ), regulatory res-
triction (ϕ), NE and the amount of subordinated debts. To 
separate them from the SFN total, the percentages of each 
band’s participation out of the total for the variable are ap-
plied. Thus, for the regulatory threshold, the percentages 74%, 
15%, and 11%, are applied to the SFN’s total RWA, divided by 
total banks in the band and, to these values, the percentage 
4.5% is applied (minimum regulatory capital required, before 
conversion). For the NE statistic, only the percentages of total 
NE is applied and divided by total banks in the band, in order 
to obtain the average per bank. For the statistic for subordi-
nated debts and equity and debt hybrid instruments (EDHI), 
we use the columns with the balance of accounts 49996003, 
49997002, 49995004, and 49998001 from the Plano Contábil, 
or Chart of Accounts, (COSIF: Available from http://www.
bcb.gov.br/?COSIF) of each database, summing the Others 
column. These COSIF accounts have a balance of subordi-
nated debts and EDHI. Table 3 presents the variables used 
by the model, and Table 4, the results for the banks in the 
sample. 
Threshold (ξ): within the average: BB, Itaú, Bradesco, 
BTG Pactual (BTG), HSBC, and Safra. Outliers: CEF, Santan-
der, Votorantim, and Citibank, with a lower threshold than 
the mean for the SFN.
Table 3   Descriptive statistic
Table 4   Descriptive statistic of the 10 biggest banks in Brazil
Variable Indicator below  1% between 1% and 3% above 3%
Threshold
Mean 236 2,553 16,838
Median 215 2,327 15,348
Standard Deviation 62 669 4,415
Net Equity
Mean 710 7,667 50,574
Median 712 7,687 50,706
Standard Deviation 133 1,441 9,502
Subordinated Debts and EDHI
Mean 719 7,763 51,203
Median 644 6,961 45,912
Standard Deviation 250 2,705 17,845
Φ
Mean 0.63 0.63 0.63
Median 0.62 0.62 0.62














































Source: Financial Stability Report and BACEN Top 50. Developed by the authors.
Source: Financial Stability Report (Mar/10 to Mar/14) and BACEN Top 50 Report and banks’ balance sheets. Developed by the authors.
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Regulatory restriction (ϕ): Itaú, Bradesco, and BTG. 
Outliers: BB, CEF, Safra, HSBC, Votorantim, and Citi-
bank, with regulatory restriction above the average, su-
ggesting RE closer to RRE. Santander exhibited a lower 
regulatory restriction than the average, suggesting RE 
further from RRE.
Subordinated Debts and EDHI: within the average: 
BB, Santander, HSBC, and Safra.  Outliers: Itaú, CEF, Bra-
desco, and BTG, with subordinated debts above the ave-
rage, suggesting more financing than required by BACEN; 
Votorantim and Citibank, with subordinated debts below 
their band, suggesting more own equity than in financing.
The 10 biggest banks in terms of total assets in the SFN 
are, in descending order: BB, Itaú, Caixa Econômica Fede-
ral (CEF), Bradesco, Santander, HSBC, Safra, BTG, Voto-
rantim, and Citibank (BACEN TOP 50 – Dec/13), totaling 
approximately R$5tn, 75.1% of the SFN. The Koziol and 
Lawrenz (2012) model estimates optimal debt, based on 
NE estimated by cash flow. However, in Brazil, banks’ NE is 
not composed solely of share capital and profits, with there 
being other elements that generate displacement between 
real and estimated NE. However, our interest here is in 
evaluating the capital structure comparatively and, for the 
same bank, with subordinated debts and CoCos; thus, an 
increase or reduction in NE does not alter the bank’s inter-
nal relationship with CoCos or subordinated debts. 
If b* is the optimal debt coupon estimated by the model, 
and current b is the current coupon, then except for Voto-
rantim, all of the banks would increase their debt coupons, 
as in Table 5.
 4   RESULTS ANALYSIS
Table 5   Debt coupon and net equity of banks
Table 6   Results expected by the model to analyze hypothesis 1




Pactual HSBC Safra Votorantim Citibank
b* 5,525 14,855 7,569 13,806 4,459 2,127 775 914 218 74
current b 3,838 3,809 2,348 1,072 682 731 293 37 646 0
Sbt 45,343 59,349 74,604 76,592 29,390 10,317 3,386 7,577 6,004 747
Current NE 72,225 81,024 35,373 70,940 62,819 16,091 10,009 7,559 7,141 6,851
Parameter Description Expected Result Justification
Φ Regulatory restriction on mini-
mum capital 
Φ < 1
Bank is able to raise new capital to avoid insol-
vency, even with cash flow lower than the total 
to be paid in interest.
Vt
b, Vt
c Value of bank Vt
b< Vt
c
Value of bank, with contingent convertibles, is 
greater than the value with subordinated debts, 
since the benefit of conversion requires higher 
coupons, and higher tax benefits. 
 , Maximization of value of bank <
Shows that the optimal coupon in subordinated 
debts (b*) must be lower than the optimal cou-
pon in contingent convertibles.
Pξc,T,Pξb,T Probability of insolvency Pξc,T < Pξb,T
The probability of insolvency of contingent con-
vertibles is lower than the probability of subordi-
nated debts, given the benefit of conversion.
Source: Developed by the authors.
Source: Developed by the authors.
The results expected for hypothesis 1 are described in Table 6, and the results for each bank compose Table 7.
Value of Bank (Vtb e Vtc): with optimal debt, the evi-
dence shows a higher value for banks financed by Co-
Cos than for those with subordinated debts, with the 
exception of CEF, Safra, and Citibank, which exhibit 
equal values, suggesting that the proposed structure is 
indifferent to the type of financing. No bank exhibited 
a lower value, with CoCos, than the value with subordi-
nated debts.
Maximization of value of bank (     <     ): all the banks 
exhibited a higher CoCo coupon than that for subor-
dinated debts, that is, the value of a bank with CoCos 
would be higher than the value with subordinated debts.
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Table 7   Results for the banks for hypothesis 1
Table 8   Results expected by the model for analyzing hypothesis 2
Source: Developed by the authors.
Probability of insolvency (Pξc,T,Pξb,T): the probabilities 
are very close to zero for both debts – with the exception 
of BB, with a likelihood of insolvency of 0.48%, and of 
BTG Pactual, with 2.28%, both with subordinated debts. 
No bank exhibited a greater likelihood of insolvency with 
CoCos than with subordinated debts.
 Thus, through the Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) model 
and with the assumptions used, we have evidence that 
the results for all of the banks are compatible with hy-
pothesis 1.
For hypothesis 2, Table 8 shows the expected results, 
and Table 9 exhibits those found.
Derivatives of net equity over risk (       ,      ): the result 
with subordinated debts was positive for BB, Itaú Uni-
banco, Bradesco, Santander, BTG Pactual, HSBC, and Ci-
tibank. From the model, these banks should have a low 
threshold with the incentive to take more risks. For CEF, 
Safra, and Votorantim, the result was negative, suggesting 
that these banks have a sufficiently high threshold with the 
incentive to avoid risks. The result with CoCos was posi-
tive for all of the banks, suggesting that they have a suffi-
ciently high threshold and have incentives to avoid risks. 
The derivative of net equity over risk for all of the banks 
was higher with CoCos than with subordinated debts       < 
, suggesting that CoCos increase the incentive for risk 
when no risk restrictions exist.




Pactual HSBC Safra Votorantim Citibank
Φ 0.76 0.66 0.73 0.66 0.57 0.61 0.86 0.78 0.77 0.76
b* 5,525 14,855 7,569 13,806 4,459 2,127 775 914 218 74
Stb 36,630 7,835 86,375 30,061 31,732 532 3,221 7,148 15,820 2,198
Stc 36,124 8,306 86,375 30,088 31,988 2,185 3,224 7,148 16,397 2,183
Vt
b (b*) 229,802 217,007 198,490 241,793 102,705 20,003 27,478 26,225 26,803 6,003
Vt
c (c*) 231,312 217,560 198,490 241,828 102,980 22,264 27,481 26,225 26,923 6,003
-3.85 3.16 3.85 3.80 3.50 -3.85 3.73 3.85 3.10 3.84
5.12 3.85 3.85 3.87 3.99 5.12 3.92 3.85 4.36 3.85
Pξb,T 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.89% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Pξc,T 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Parameter Description Expected Results Justification
Φ Regulatory restriction for 
minimum capital 
Φ < 1
Bank is able to raise new capital to avoid insolvency, 
even with cash flow lower than the total to be paid 
in interest. 
Vtb,Vtc Value of bank Vtb < Vtc
Value of bank, with contingent convertibles, is grea-
ter than the value with subordinated debts, since the 
benefit of conversion requires higher coupons, and 
greater tax benefits.
, Maximization of value of bank <
Shows that the optimal coupon in subordinated 
debts (b*) must be lower than the optimal coupon in 
contingent convertibles.
Pξc,T,Pξb,T Probabilities of insolvency Pξc,T < Pξb,T
The probability of insolvency of contingent conver-
tibles is lower than the probability of subordinated 
debts, given the benefit of conversion.
Derivative of net equity over 
risk with subordinated debts
 > 0 Low ξ threshold and shareholders have the incentive 
to take more risks.
 < 0 Sufficiently high ξ threshold and shareholders have 
the incentive to avoid risks.
ξ Conversion threshold
ξ > critical ξ Bank does not have a preference for high risk.
ξ < critical ξ Bank has incentives to increase risks.
ξ = critical ξ Bank is indifferent to the risk strategy.
optimal ξ < critical ξ Free of financial restrictions, the bank will always 
have the incentive to increase risks.
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Threshold (ξ): BB, Itaú Unibanco, Bradesco, Santan-
der, BTG Pactual, HSBC, and Citibank exhibited a lower 
threshold than the critical threshold (ξ < critical ξ), sugges-
ting that they have incentives for taking risks. CEF, Safra, 
and Votorantim exhibited a higher threshold than the cri-
tical threshold (ξ > critical ξ), suggesting that they do not 
have preferences for high risks. Analyzing the rule for opti-
mal financing choice in the model, BB, Itaú Unibanco, Bra-
desco, Santander, BTG Pactual, HSBC, and Citibank follow 
the rule: if ξ < ξ then 0 <       |b=b*<       |c=c* and they will always 
prefer taking risk to maintaining capital at an optimal level, 
whether with subordinated debts or with CoCos. CEF, Sa-
fra, and Votorantim follow the rule: if ξ > ξ then       |b=b*<0 
and      |c=c*   0 and they will always prefer low risk with su-
bordinated debts, even if they can opt for greater risk, with 
financing in CoCos at the optimal level.
Table 9   Results for the sample banks for hypothesis 2
Source: Developed by the authors.
Derivative of net equity over 
risk with convertible contin-
gents
> 0 Low ξ threshold and shareholders have the incentive 
to take more risk.
< 0 Sufficiently high ξ threshold and shareholders have 
the incentive to avoid risks.
, Derivative of net equity over 
risk
< Contingent convertibles increase the incentive for 
risk displacement.
ξ           , Rule for optimal 
financing choice
If ξ < ξ then 0 <         |b=b* 
<   ∂   |c=c*
With weak financial restrictions, banks will always 
prefer to take more risk than maintain capital at opti-
mal level, whether with subordinated debts, or with 
contingent convertibles.
If ξ > ξ then       |b=b*< 0
and <       |c=c*   0
With strong financial restrictions, banks will always 
prefer low risk with subordinated debts, even if they 
can opt for higher risk with financing in contingent 
convertibles at the optimal level.
, Value of banks with risks  < 0 and         < 0
Shows that the optimal subordinated debt coupon 
(b*) should be lower than the optimal contingent 
convertible coupon.
σ Risk σl ≤ σh ≤ σ
A bank’s current risk should be lower than the risk at 
which the value of the bank with subordinated debts 
is equal to the value with contingent convertibles. 
And both should be lower than the risk where the 
probability of insolvency of the bank with subordina-
ted debts equals the probability of insolvency of the 
banks with contingent convertibles. 
ΔPT
Difference between the proba-
bilities of insolvency
ΔPTb-c ≤ 0
The probability of insolvency of contingent conver-
tibles is higher than that of subordinated debts in a 
non regulated environment. However, the delta is 
expected to be negative.
Table 8   Continued




Pactual HSBC Safra Votorantim Citibank
ξ 16,472 14,505 8,475 14,538 4,265 1,525 2,165 1,547 890 303
critical ξ 18,922 17,491 6,438 16,279 5,216 1,783 2,262 1,465 784 345
optimal ξ 15,601 16,614 6,323 15,599 4,403 1,606 2,186 1,429 559 321
60,525 32,008 (0.00) 2,065 7,079 13,384 208 -19.10 -1,232 2
139,003 813,901 0.00 74,661 46,201 3,379 4,120 18.70 1,376 13
σl 0.11 0.0514 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.21 0.05
σh 0.12 0.0515 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.21 0.05
σ 0.12 0.0554 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.05 ND 0.05
-6,510 -1,626 0 -139 -800 -23 -6 0 -265 0
-5,000 -1,103 0 -87 -486 -19 -2 0 -234 0
ΔPξ,T,σ -0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -2.89% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ΔPξ,T,σ 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ND: Not defined. 
Source: Developed by the authors.
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Value of bank with risk (      ,    ): it will be analyzed 
whether coupons in CoCos are greater than coupons in 
subordinated debts, through the value of banks. For all of 
the banks, the derivatives for the value of banks in rela-
tion to β is negative, suggesting that, even in environments 
with risks, the optimal coupon in CoCos is greater than 
the optimal coupon in subordinated debts.
Risk (σ): the risk has 3 different parameters, namely: σl 
is the risk of the bank with subordinated debts, that is, it 
should be the lowest risk, even in non regulated environ-
ments; σh is the risk of the bank when the value of the bank 
with subordinated debts equals the value of the bank with 
CoCos (σh=σ =sup{σh | Vtc (σh)≥Vtb (σl)}). At this moment, 
the bank is assuming more risk with greater probability 
of insolvency, however, does not yet suffer from financial 
difficulties; and lastly, σ (called critical value) is the limit of 
risk that the bank can reach before starting to suffer from 
financial difficulties, that is, it is the level at which the pro-
babilities of insolvency with subordinated debts and Co-
Cos is equal (σ =inf{σh | Pξ,σh,T ≥ Pξ,σl,T}). The results for the 
capital structure proposed by the model are:
σl<σh<σ - BB, Itaú Unibanco, and Santander: low risk 
in non regulated environments, and where this risk may 
increase in search of higher returns, up to σh. Passing σh, 
the value of the bank starts to fall in relation to the value 
with subordinated debts, until it starts to suffer from fi-
nancial difficulties, in σ.
σl = σh = σ - CEF and Citibank: high risk in non re-
gulated environments, being at the limit of financial di-
fficulties, that is, in an environment with well defined 
regulation, these banks would have an optimal structure 
and maximum return. However, if the regulation ceases to 
exist, these banks would be at the limit and become insol-
vent and without room to increase their risks.
σl < σh = σ - Bradesco and BTG Pactual: low risk in 
non regulated environments, and where risk may incre-
ase in search of greater returns. However, if the value of 
subordinated debts equals the value of CoCos, they would 
be at the limit and become insolvent and without room to 
increase their risks.
σl = σh < σ – HSBC and Safra: high risk in non regula-
ted environments, but not yet suffering financial difficul-
ties, that is, there is no advantage in increasing risk.
σl = σh < ND - For Votorantim it was not possible to 
estimate the σ. Thus, it could be considered in the group σl 
= σh = σ, given that the values are very close.
The results of the Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) model with 
the assumptions used suggest that BB, Itaú Unibanco, San-
tander, Bradesco, BTG Pactual, HSBC, and Citibank would 
have a preference and incentives to take more risk (           > 0 e ξ 
< critical ξ), but only BB, Itaú Unibanco, Santander, Brades-
co, BTG Pactual, and HSBC (σl<σh<σ e σl=σh<σ) would have 
room to, in fact, increase risk. Citibank, despite the preferen-
ces and incentives, does not have any room to increase risk in 
environments without regulation (σl = σh = σ). CEF, Votoran-
tim, and Safra do not have preferences or incentives for risk 
(       < 0 e ξ < critical ξ)  and are in situations that do not favor 
this increase (σl = σh= σ e σl = σh < σ).
Difference in the probabilities of insolvency (ΔPT): analyzing 
the difference between the probabilities of insolvency in risks 
σl and σ, all of the banks exhibited a negative result or one 
equal to zero, so that no bank is in the insolvency band.
Thus, from the Koziol and Lawrenz (2012) model and 
with the assumptions used, all of the banks exhibited results 
within those expected, so that such results are compatible 
with Proposals 1, 2, and 3. 
The Koziol and Lzwrenz (2012) model was applied to 
the 10 biggest Brazilian banks in terms of total assets with 
the National Financial System and, taking into account 
the new level I defined by BACEN – composed not only 
of share capital, but of CoCos of additional capital and 
countercyclical capital, in which the conversion threshold 
of these is defined as 4.5% of RWA – we endeavored to 
find out whether at the close of 2013 (4Q2013) these banks 
would be better capitalized with Cocos than with subordi-
nated debts.
From the model, these banks, in fact, would be better 
capitalized with CoCos than with subordinated debts. Ho-
wever, thinking of efficiency, there may be a better optimi-
zed capital structure composed of CoCos and subordinated 
debts, but this model does not allow this type of structure 
to be tested. Moreover, this study analyzes capital structure 
at a specific moment; however, the model allows cash flows 
to be projected simulating economic cycles, which would 
allow it to be tested whether, in fact, the Basel III regulation 
is efficient in cases of crises that are very close, in which the 
recapitalization time for the bank would be short. Howe-
ver, that would be the subject of an upcoming study.
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